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Abstract In this paper, we use tax and household survey data to assess the history
of income distribution in Argentina since the beginning of the 20th century. Until
the 1970s, the country experienced a fall in inequality in spite of lower income
growth. Since then, inequality has generally increased possibly as a result of large-
scale shocks such as macroeconomic crises and reform attempts, resulting in a
convergence towards traditionally more unequal neighboring countries.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the evolution of the distribution of income in Argentina over a
period of 75 years. Its starting point is the decade of 1930, when the country
displayed a rather high level of inequality—above other advanced economies. This
high inequality set the stage for the policies of Peron and others, which were
justified—in part—as attempts to make Argentina a less unequal nation. We deal
with the international conditions, the policies and the macroeconomic performance
behind these inequality trends in Argentina over the 20th century. However, any
explanation of the dynamics of inequality and growth in Argentina faces strong
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limitations in terms of (1) economic theory, (2) the multitude of simultaneous
confounding factors and (3) the quality of the statistical evidence available.
Moreover, these limitations are reinforced by the peculiarly complex history of the
country. We have adopted here a historical perspective.
The evolution of income and wealth inequality during the process of develop-
ment has attracted enormous attention in the economics literature.1 From a historical
perspective, this focus was initially concerned with the functional distribution of
income between factors of production. The classical view saw workers, capitalists
and landlords as separate classes, receiving wages, profits and rent. Workers were
assumed to be at the bottom of the hierarchy, and a fall in their share increased
inequality. In logic, there was no necessary reason. Later, the analysis has turned to
the concept of personal distribution. Nevertheless, as pointed out in Atkinson (1997)
many of the links between income distribution and the functioning of the economy
are still missing in the theory: we do not know much about the precise connections
between inequality and the macroeconomic variables, and the inter-relationships
between economic performance and distribution. Economic theory offers a series of
valuable insights, but it is not able today to provide a comprehensive explanation of
the observed dynamics of individuals’ income and the joint distribution of earned
income and capital income, taking simultaneously into consideration supply and
demand forces, social norms, public choice issues and government actions. This is
certainly not an easy task. Atkinson et al. (2010) recognize that building a link
between theory and empirical specification is not straightforward. The Kuznets
inverse-U curve is one of the best examples: its popularity far exceeds its empirical
support. As indicated by Piketty (2001), Piketty (2003) and Alvaredo and Piketty
(2009), Kuznets stressed in his 1955 article the key role played by wars, inflation,
recessions, and the rise of progressive taxation, though this is not the part of the
explanation that most economists choose to remember. It was only at the end of his
presidential address to the 1954 annual meeting of the American Economic
Association that he suggested that an additional process (based on the well-known
two-sector model) might also have played a role. As he himself put it quite directly,
what was at the stake in the 1950s was nothing but ‘‘the future prospect of the
underdeveloped countries within the orbit of the free world.’’ Thus, the optimistic
theory of the inverse-U curve is the product of the cold war, as stressed by Piketty
(2006).
Increasingly, multi-sector models have dominated the literature on the analysis of
income distribution and growth in Argentina—see for instance the discussion and
the model proposed by Galiani and Somaini in this special collection. While not
able to satisfy Atkinson, Piketty and Saez’s demanding criteria, these simplistic
theoretical models try to highlight the salience of Argentina’s starting conditions in
terms of its comparative advantages in land and agriculture, and the complex
political economy implied by the development of a relatively well-educated
workforce in this context. These particular conditions set out a complicated political
1 There is a longstanding literature on the political economy of inequality along the development process
– see Hirschman (1973) for a classic analysis, and Robinson (2010) for a recent discussion of
redistributive policies in the Latin American context.
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economy environment whereby distributional conflict drives the alternation between
outward and inward-oriented development strategies, with fundamental conse-
quences for long run growth and for inequality itself, both as a determinant and a
result of economic policy.
The consequences of this process can be appreciated in the evolution of income
and its distribution over time for Argentina. Figure 1 displays the share of the top
1% of the income distribution between 1932 and 2007 based on personal income tax
records, and the share of the top 1 and 10% from households’ surveys between 1974
and 2009. The plot is eloquent of Argentina’s distributive performance, with
subsequent periods of raising and declining inequality. Figure 2 in turn illustrates
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
19
32
19
37
19
42
19
47
19
52
19
57
19
62
19
67
19
72
19
77
19
82
19
87
19
92
19
97
20
02
20
07
In
co
m
e 
Sh
ar
e
Top 1% - Tax records
Top 1% - Households surveys
Top 10% - Households surveys
Fig. 1 The top income share in Argentina from tax records (national) and household surveys (Greater
Buenos Aires), 1932–2009. Income excludes capital gains Source: Alvaredo (2010), Gasparini and
Cruces (2010); The World Top Incomes Database
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Fig. 2 Average real income and consumer price index in Argentina, 1932–2004. Figure reports the
average real income per adult (aged 20 and above), expressed in 2000 Pesos Source: The World Top
Incomes Database
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the relative stagnation of real income over the long run, which grew by less than
two-thirds over the same period. The combination of both graphs indicates that the
interaction between changes in aggregate income levels and in their distribution is a
salient feature of Argentina in the 20th century. It should be clear, however, that it is
misleading to talk of ‘‘trends’’ when describing the evolution of income inequality.
Instead, and along with Atkinson (1997) we follow a much more compelling
episodic history of inequality changes in Argentina. The country experienced strong
shocks and policy changes that affected the income distribution in different ways.
Since the logic behind the inequality changes is different in each episode, a long-
term perspective would miss much of the action, and would probably be unhelpful
for thinking about the future. Like any other modeling exercise, however, this
episodic history tries to highlight the main aspects from a very complex stream of
phenomena. Our description and conclusions are, therefore, based on our reading of
the events. In some way, the historical narrative is part of the evidence. As
(Atkinson et al. 2010) point out, ‘‘in combining disparate sets of information, the
authors are not carrying out a mechanical operation, but exercising judgement about
the strengths and weaknesses of different sources. These narratives are of course
subjective, reflecting the standpoints of the authors, and there will no doubt be
disagreement about the interpretation of history. But equally they cannot be
dismissed.’’
As described by Della Paolera and Taylor (2001) and many other researchers,
Argentina was once a relatively rich country that has consistently diverged from the
industrial economies in the last 50 years; today it is indistinguishably a middle-
income emerging economy. The deterioration of the country’s relative position is
often referred to as one of the puzzling cases in the economics of development. It
was not a smooth process. The wealth-creating export-based growth model initiated
in the second half of the 19th century had its own limitations: high dependency
rates, the need on external funding, a large but finite land stock.2 Nevertheless, the
circumstances helped create an atmosphere of unlimited growth possibilities, which
was mutually shared by the ruling class, the people and the immigrants. In contrast,
the last 50 years are much more difficult to summarize. While Western countries
(including Australia and New Zealand, but also Mexico and Brazil) experienced
significant growth after the Second World War, Argentina stagnated and later
declined. Political turmoil, institutional instability, macroeconomic volatility,
income stagnation, high inflation and two hyperinflations dominated the scenario.
Cycles of poor economic performance and continuous political upheavals were
associated with the conflict of interests between the landed gentry and the
industrialist elite, and with the integration and final acceptance of the working
classes into the social and political system. Between 1956 and 2004 real per capita
GDP, only grew at an annual rate of less than 1%; if we consider the figures in the
aftermath of the 2001 macroeconomic crisis, the average income did not virtually
grew in the 30 years following 1973. By the end of 2002, the unemployment rate
was well above 20%; GDP sunk by 20% and poverty rates skyrocketed, but
2 For an analysis of these limitations, see Taylor (1992).
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recovery resumed rapidly, and the economy grew at annual rates of 7–9% until
2007.
The academic and non-academic statements about Argentina’s performance
regarding income distribution, growth and institutions are usually (always?) tainted
by ideological preconceptions. We will not offer here a definitive view, but expect
to provide the reader with some facts to judge those statements critically, as they
need to be qualified. Robinson (2010) sensibly argues that ‘‘it is not possible to talk
about the market distribution of income as if that were somehow free of politics. It is
the political system, after all, that determines the nature of property rights and how
free the market is.’’ There is the view that high inequality in the first decades of the
twentieth century led to redistributive policies that made the country far more equal
but also hurt its economic performance; this view sometimes sees a negative
correlation between inequality and growth or, more frequently, it implies that the
specific peronist social policies were fundamentally flawed. There are several steps
in the argument, and it is unlikely that they will be 1 day uncontroversially settled.
It is important to note here that the structural decline of capital concentration that
took place between 1914 and 1945 in the developed countries does not seem to have
had a negative impact on growth; on the contrary, per capita growth rates were
substantially higher in the postwar period (years of the expansion of the welfare
state) than in the nineteenth century: high levels of concentration were not a
prerequisite for growth.
The remainder of this paper attempts to make sense of these trends in long run
income and its distribution by means of an analytical narrative that draws on
original empirical evidence and on existing studies of the economic and political
factors behind these trends. Section 2 covers the 1932–1973 period and is based
mainly on income tax information, while Sect. 3 covers the years 1974–2007 based
on household survey data. While the availability of the latter allows for a more
detailed analysis at the micro-level, the narratives rely on the same implicit models,
which highlight the salience of trade and comparative advantages, the population’s
level of education and the ensuing distributional conflict and its related redistribu-
tive policies. The discussions, thus, cover a series of issues such as trade policy,
terms of trade, taxation, technical change, macroeconomic performance, labor
regulations, the power of unions and structural reforms.
It is not possible to account for all the complex interactions and phenomena
underlying the long period of time in these few pages, and this must be seen as a
shortcoming. In this sense, this paper is not addressed to experts in the field, but to a
broader general audience. Firstly, we do not analyze in depth almost any of the
phenomena mentioned. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this review
mentions only briefly the political and social forces underlying the trends described
here. Hopefully, by concentrating on the evolution of income distribution over time,
our analysis complements the efforts regarding these other topics presented in this
special collection. Interested readers are also referred to the cited bibliography. The
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the dynamics of top incomes in
Argentina since 1932 based on personal income tax statistics. Section 3 discusses
the evolution of income inequality over the last 30 years based on survey data.
Section 4 is devoted to the conclusions.
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2 An episodic history of income concentration in Argentina 1932–1970:
evidence from tax statistics3
This section summarizes the dynamics of the concentration of income between 1932
and 1961 based on income tax statistics.4 Due to the fact that only a small fraction of
the population was subject to the income tax, we can only analyze the very top of
the distribution, as depicted in Fig. 1 for the share of the top 1%. Nevertheless, this
source of information is useful for the study of distributive trends, covered in
Sects. 2.1–2.3, and also allows for international comparisons, which are described
in Sect. 2.4.
2.1 The years 1932–1945
In 1929, the Argentine economy—and especially its elite—was suddenly shocked
by the Great Depression and the dramatic downturn of conditions in the
international markets. The democratic government could not cope with the crisis,
and was deposed by the first coup d’e´tat that ended 68 years of constitutional rule.
The inability of the elite to understand and adapt to the new situation within
constitutional principles, the fear of anarchism and socialism and the necessity to
regain political control shaped the following 13 years, 1930–1943, known as the
Conservative Restoration and the Infamous Decade. It was a period of electoral
fraud, union conflicts and the increasing importance of the army in political affairs.
Economic recovery began in 1933 after several years of negative growth. By 1935,
GDP had regained the level of 1928. The positive slope displayed by top income
shares between 1933 and 1943 (Fig. 1) seems consistent with an increase in
concentration during the marked recovery of the economy after the Great
Depression. The share of the top percentile rose by 50% from 1933 to 1943.
Great Britain, the principal destination for exports, abandoned free trade
practices and made preferential agreements with the ex-colonies during the Imperial
Economic Conference celebrated in Ottawa in 1932 to promote trade within the
limits of the empire. Argentina was set aside. The rich landowners pressured for a
rapid accord with London to secure the exports to the United Kingdom. The result
was the Roca-Runciman agreement, which guaranteed Argentina a fixed share in the
British meat market and eliminated tariffs on Argentine cereals. In return, Argentina
3 The results presented in this section are taken from Alvaredo (2010).
4 Our starting point is determined by the source of information: the first personal income tax was
established in Argentina in 1932. Income tax data suffer from some serious drawbacks. The definitions of
taxable income and tax unit tend to change through time according to the tax laws. While there is a
predisposition to under-reporting certain types of income, taxpayers also undertake a variety of avoidance
responses, including planning, renaming and retiming of activities to legally reduce the tax liability.
Capital incomes and capital gains are taxed at different degrees across time. These elements, which are
common to all countries, become critical in developing economies. However, alternative sources such as
household surveys are not free from problems regarding under-reporting, differential non-responses, unit
design and information at the top of the distribution. Therefore, even if results based on income tax
statistics must be read with caution, especially in the case of countries with important levels of tax
evasion, they can still be informative and remain a unique source to study the dynamics of income
concentration during the first half of the twentieth century.
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agreed to restrictions with regard to trade and currency exchange, and preserved
Britain’s commercial interests in the country. From the macroeconomic point of
view, the nature and consequences of this agreement and the true impact on the
economic performance are still the topic of academic controversy. There are those
who see the treaty as a sell-out to Britain, while others stress that the United
Kingdom, by according privileges not given to any other country outside the empire,
helped counter the recessionary situation. From the microeconomic side, it may be
regarded as a successful mechanism to preserve the elite’s (but also the state’s)
sources of revenue. It must be said, however, that exports more than doubled
between 1932 and 1937 almost everywhere in Latin America; Argentina was
additionally favored by rising export prices because of droughts in many
agricultural competitors. In any case, the Roca-Runciman agreement remains a
historical landmark, and the dynamics of top incomes reinforces the idea of the
elite’s favorable situation during the second half of the decade of 1930.
While top shares started a sustained decrease by the beginning of the Second
World War in the developed world (Atkinson and Piketty 2007), they kept growing
in Argentina, favored by the export demand from Europe and the evolution of the
price of commodities. The country was officially neutral during most of the war for
several reasons. On the one hand, a relevant sector of the army showed a clear
preference for the Axis. On the other hand, the British interests in Argentina
encouraged neutrality, as it ensured the continuation of normal trade with Europe
and mainly with the United Kingdom. Great Britain opposed all US proposals of
economic sanctions against Argentina, based on the fact that Argentina’s neutrality
was crucial for ensuring the safe arrival of shipments to British ports. In any case,
the elite had been successful again: during the war, 40% of the British meat and
grain markets were supplied by Argentina (Rapoport 1980).
The strong connection between the relatively favorable world market conditions
and the evolution of top incomes over this period can be seen in Fig. 3, which
displays the total real income reported by the top 1% and top 0.1% income
recipients along with total agricultural and livestock exports on a logarithmic scale
from 1932 to 1956. The two series are highly correlated and show that when exports
increased, high incomes got a larger share of national income, explaining why top
incomes followed exports cycles over this period.
2.2 The years 1946–1955: a great compression
The Pero´n years (1943/1946–1955) coincide with a clear decline in the share of the
top percentile, which moved down to around 15% in 1953. Mainly at the expense of
rural rents and favored by the accumulation of foreign reserves and the
advantageous terms of trade in the world markets after the Second World War
and the War of Korea, the Peronist government deepened the industrialization
process that had begun many years before, fostered by the impossibility of getting
necessary imports from Europe during the war. A deliberate inward-looking policy
to finance industrialization and social improvements with rural rents was also to
modify the structure of the wealthy sector. New industrial families appeared, but
also the old names, traditionally attached to land wealth, diversified to industrial
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production. One important instrument of the Peronist policy was the IAPI, Institute
for the Promotion of Trade, which established a state monopoly on exports and
limited the gains of large estates proprietors. This State management of exports was
a powerful tool in extracting a fraction of the surplus from exporters. The IAPI was
disbanded as soon as Pero´n was deposed in 1955.
Until the beginning of the decade of 1950, the government embarked upon a
large redistributive policy and set the grounds for the welfare state and the
development of the powerful middle class that characterized the country by the end
of decade of 1960. It is this period that remained in the ‘collective memory’ as the
clearest expression of the economic policies of Peronism—the paper by Di Tella
and Dubra in this special collection analyzes in a peculiar way these policies and the
associated discourse. The development of a progressive personal taxation system
played a secondary role, the redistribution being achieved by direct public
assistance, subsidized interest rate in the credit markets, price controls, a minimum
wage policy, and the state management of exports. Even if income tax rates
increased steadily, the number of taxpayers was kept low due to relatively high
taxable thresholds. On the eve of Pero´n’s presidency, the top marginal rate doubled,
from 12 to 25% between 1942 and 1943, and was subsequently increased to 27% in
1946, 32% in 1952 and 40% by 1955. Those rates were similar to the levels found in
Chile and Brazil, but well below the rates applied to top incomes in developed
countries such as France, UK or the United States.5
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Fig. 3 Agricultural and livestock exports and income at the top, Argentina 1932–1956. Income at the top
1 and 0.1% is the real amount of income reported by the top 1 and 0.1% income recipients. The vertical
axis measures the logarithm of exports and the logarithm of the top 1% and the top 0.1% incomes
Sources: Alvaredo (2010) and The World Top Incomes Database for income, and Vazquez Presedo
(1998) for exports
5 In the United States, top income tax rates were consistently above 60 percent from 1932 to 1981, and
above 90 percent from 1951 to 1963. In the UK, the top marginal tax rates were between 89 and 98
percent between 1940 and 1978. In France, they were equal to or higher than 60 percent from 1941 to
1985 [see Alvaredo et al. (2013), and Piketty and Saez (2013)].
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Along with many other transformations, social and labor rights were enforced,
unions gained in power, and a generalized national pension system was organized.
The Peronist redistributive policy was successful and visible among the working
class; this is a widely acknowledged phenomenon. The use of the income tax
statistics let us numerically assess the magnitude of the losses experienced by the
richest during the Peronist phase. The top percentile share moved down from 25.9%
in 1943 to 15.3% in 1953. The most affected seem to have been the richest among
the rich: the top 0.1% decreased from 11.6 to 5.1% and the top 0.01% declined from
4.1 to 1.4% in the same period. The reduction in income concentration was far from
trivial, although it had only a limited effect on top incomes by international
standards: income concentration in Argentina was still higher than in advanced
economies during the same period (see Sect. 2.4 below for an international
comparison).
After the frantic expansion of the economy during the years 1946–1949 of
Peron’s first term, a crisis in the external sector in 1949 forced major changes in the
economic policy; initially the expansion of the public sector was held back while
attempts were made to retain the policy of increasing wages. A new crisis took place
in 1952 (negative trade balance, recession and demonetization). Thereafter,
redistribution and credit policies became more prudent and incentives were
introduced to favor the agricultural sector (which would always be the main export
sector and, as such, the main provider of foreign reserves), which may explain the
moderate impact of the drop in exports on top incomes shown in Fig. 3 that year.
Some recovery of top shares seems to have started even before the end of Pero´n’s
government.
Even if our data do not allow for a detailed explanation of what was happening
below the top 1%, the drop in the top shares that took place until the middle of the
decade of 1950 coincided with a general improvement in terms of income
distribution, as indicated by the fact that the participation of labor in total income in
national accounts increased by 8% between 1945 and 1954 (Altimir and Beccaria
1999). The ratio of labor to GDP reached a historical maximum of 50.8% in 1954,
1 year before the military coup that deposed Pero´n.
2.3 The years 1956–1970
After 1955, the intrinsic limits of the import-substitution industrialization strategy
(which began to become apparent by the end of Pero´n’s period) resulted in a
sequence of oscillating economic policies with deep social and political implica-
tions during the following 20 years. Neither the pro-industrialization sector nor the
agricultural-based exporter sector (whose interests did not coincide) was powerful
enough to permanently dominate the other. There was also the now powerful
working class. Repeated cycles of short expansions and contractions, increasing
inflation and institutional weakness dominated the period. The model in the Galiani
and Somaini’s paper in this special collection details some of the political economy
mechanisms behind this distributive conflict, whereas the Brambilla, Galiani and
Porto’s paper describes the oscillation in trade policy over the same period.
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The agrarian activities were responsible of generating the surpluses to foster
industry and finance the imports of inputs and capital goods demanded by the
expanding manufacturing sector. The exchange rate was usually fixed to help
maintain low levels of inflation and high stability of import prices (denominated
in local currency). At the same time, extensive and deliberate foreign trade
protection secured the industry from external competition even in the face of the
appreciation of the exchange rate. As exports were mainly based on food
products, any devaluation implied a real loss for wage earners. Consequently, a
fixed exchange rate, with a tendency to appreciation, favored both workers and
industrialists (protected from external competition) while it acted as a clear
disincentive to landowners. The economic tensions translated to the political
arena.
Under this scheme, any acceleration of the economy led to fewer exports (more
exportable goods were demanded internally) and more imports of inputs and capital
goods. Consuming more tradable goods, together with the discouragement of
agriculture, generated recurrent balance of payment crises and output contractions.
Sometimes the endogenous limits in this development strategy were reinforced by
international conditions (drop in world prices of commodities) so that crises also
occurred even if the economy was not growing rapidly. The way out of the crisis
always implied a tightening of fiscal and monetary policies together with large
devaluations that corrected the distortion in prices, favoring land-based activities
again, drastically reducing the real value of wages, increasing exports and regaining
foreign reserves. Then, the process could restart.
The ‘‘stop-and-go’’ nature of economic policy, which eventually ended by the
middle of the 1970s (to inaugurate a decade of stagnation and very high inflation),
expressed therefore the limits to industrialization.6 It was, nevertheless, a period of
reasonable income growth vis-a`-vis the poor performance that the economy
displayed between 1981 and 1991.7 The sudden movements of the nominal
exchange rate ultimately led to violent redistributions among workers, the
manufacturing sector and the export-oriented agricultural sector.8
For this period, we only have observations of top shares for 1958, 1959, 1961,
when they show a very small decline, and for 1970, when income concentration
seems to be considerably lower than in the 1950s and early 1960s. However, it
should be stressed that there is considerable (additional) uncertainty about this last
observation.9
6 For an analytic approach to the ‘stop-and-go’ model, see Braun and Joy (1967).
7 The political economy and the economic policy of this period have been widely analysed in Diaz-
Alejandro (1970), Mallon and Sourrouille (1975), Di Tella and Dornbusch (1983), Di Tella and
Zymelman (1967), Di Tella and Zymelman (1973) among others.
8 The determination of the nominal exchange rate began to play a key and privileged role in all the
spheres of the economy. Di Tella (1987) has characterized the styled facts of the pendular policy: a
‘repressed stage,’ when key prices were controlled to tame inflation, and a ‘loosening stage’, when
controls collapsed and inflation jumped.
9 Tax-based raw data are also available for 1971, 1972 and 1973, but it is difficult to establish their
consistency and accuracy.
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2.4 Income concentration in Argentina in international perspective,
1932–1970
The previous sections discussed the trends in inequality as approximated by the
shares of high incomes between 1932 and 1970. Recent work on top income shares
allows the comparison of the level and trend of income concentration in Argentina
with respect to advanced economies. As discussed in Sect. 1, Argentina was one of
the richest countries in the early twentieth century. Figure 4 displays the top 1%
income shares in several economies of ‘new settlement,’ which are the subject of
permanent comparison among scholars when trying to understand and explain the
divergence of Argentina. Even if the levels of shares in Argentina, Canada, New
Zealand and the United States—but not in Australia—seem similar in the early
1930s (a commonality which is lost shortly afterwards), it is necessary to stress that
several methodological issues limit the comparability of levels across countries (see
Atkinson and Piketty 2007): the plot should be read in terms of dynamics and not
levels. The same remark applies to Fig. 5, which displays the top 0.1% income
shares in Argentina, France, the United States, Italy, UK, Spain and South Africa.
Comparing South Africa and Argentina is particularly interesting: top shares show
very similar movements between 1940 and 1960: those were the years of the initial
enforcement and development of apartheid in South Africa, which broadly coincide
with the accession of Peron to power, as well as with the consequences of his social
and economic policies, and with the WWII and the postwar situation. This suggests
that the effect of global markets and international conditions affecting world
suppliers of raw materials, that is, globalization, also plays a key role in the
determination of inequality, which interacts with local economic policies.
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As described in Atkinson and Piketty (2007), the drop in income concentration
between 1914 and 1945 in Anglo-Saxon and continental Europe countries was
primarily due to the fall in top capital incomes, as capital owners incurred severe
shocks from destruction of infrastructure, inflation, bankruptcies and fiscal policy
for financing war debts. The reason why capital incomes did not recover during the
second half of the century is still an open question; Piketty (2003) and Piketty and
Saez (2006) suggest that the introduction of generalized progressive income and
estate taxation made such a reversal impossible. For most of the period, the data for
Argentina do not offer information about the composition of taxpayers’ incomes.
This is unfortunate, as economic mechanisms can be very different for the
distribution of income from labor, capital, business and rents, and limits the
interpretation and comparison of results. In any case, while top shares started a
sustained decrease by the beginning of the Second World War in the developed
world, they kept growing in Argentina, favored by the export demand from Europe.
The Pero´n years (1946–1955) coincide with a clear decline in the share of the top
percentile, although the evidence also reveals the limited effect on the upper part of the
distributionwhen compared to international standards: by 1954 the top percentile shares
were still higher than those found in the United States, France, Canada, Australia or
Spain. Here it is worth noticing a striking contrast originated in economic policy
between Argentina and Australia. As Atkinson and Leigh (2007) describe, the effect of
the commodity price boom after the Second World War directly affected top shares in
Australia, generating a clear spike in 1950, mainly due to the peak of wool prices which
sheep farmers received in that year. The state management of exports in Argentina
seems to have been a powerful tool in extracting a fraction of the surplus from exporters,
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Fig. 5 The top 0.1% income shares in Argentina, US, France, Spain, Italy, South Africa, and UK
Sources: Argentina: Alvaredo (2010); US: Piketty and Saez (2003); France: Piketty (2001) and Landais
(2007); UK: Atkinson (2007); Italy: Alvaredo and Pisano (2010); South Africa: Alvaredo and Atkinson
(2010) Spain: Alvaredo and Saez (2009); Canada: (Saez and Veall 2005); Australia: Atkinson and Leigh
(2007); New Zealand: Atkinson and Leigh (2007); and The World Top Incomes Database. Incomes
exclude capital gains
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and as a sign of the distributional conflict surrounding trade policy the IAPI was
disbanded as soon as Pero´n was deposed in 1955.
3 An episodic history of income distribution in Argentina in the late
20th and the early 21st centuries. Evidence from households’ surveys
3.1 Overall evolution and other data sources
This section reviews the evolution of income inequality in Argentina between the
mid-1970s and the mid-2000s, some of the factors affecting this evolution, and a
comparison with other Latin American countries. The empirical evidence relies on
information from households’ surveys, which are available since 1974.
Over this period, inequality increased substantially, irrespective of the measure
employed, but with upward and downward movements.10 Figure 6 presents a
summary of this evolution by depicting the Gini coefficient for the distribution of
household per capita income in the Greater Buenos Aires area (GBA) for years of
relative stability. The Gini coefficient soared from 0.345 in 1974–0.483 in 2006.11
The upward trend is statistically significant, as shown in Table 1. It is also robust to
the choice of indicator: the share of the poorest quintile declined from 7.2 to 3.7%,
the share for the richest quintile rose more than 10 percentage points, from 41.8 to
52.6%, and the 90/10 income ratio increased from around 5 in 1974–11 in 2006.12
This change in inequality is also robust to the geographic coverage of the data.
Inequality series from 1974 can only be estimated for the Greater Buenos Aires, an
urban area containing around a third of Argentina’s total population. Notwith-
standing this limitation, the trends described in the previous paragraph can be
extrapolated to the whole urban population. Figure 7 suggests that inequality
estimates for the aggregate of all large urban areas in Argentina (available since
1992) do not differ considerably from those of the GBA.13
The trend in inequality can also be inferred from alternative data sources. Using
comparable methodologies for the 1985–1986 and 1996–1997 expenditure surveys,
Navajas (1999) reportsGini coefficients for the distribution of per capita expenditures of
0.33 and 0.38, broadly compatible with the trend in income inequality in Fig. 7.
10 This section builds on Gasparini and Cruces (2008) and Gasparini et al. (2011), developed for the
thematic Cluster on Poverty, Human Development and MDG’s of the Regional Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean (RBLAC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
11 The microdata behind these figures come from Argentina’s main official household survey (Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares, EPH), which covers the main urban areas of the country. The EPH started in the
1970 s as a survey for Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), which accounts for one-third of Argentina’s
population, and was gradually extended later to cover all urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
As most periodic household surveys in the world, the EPH records labor incomes and cash transfers
mainly, but it is weaker in capturing capital income, rents to natural resources and other sources of non-
labor income.
12 Gasparini (2005, Gasparini 2007) also establishes that this trend is robust to a host of methodological
issues, including non-response, misreporting of income, inclusion of non-monetary income, inclusion of
implicit rent from own housing, accounting for family structure and adjustment for regional prices,
among other factors.
13 See Gasparini and Cruces (2008) for more details.
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Galbraith et al. (2006) find a large increase in inequality among formalworkers between
1994 and 2002, using microdata from the social security contribution records.
It is also possible to complement indicators based on personal income with the
distribution of income between the factors of production, which can be inferred
from aggregate national accounts. While the share of wages was around 45 percent
in the early 1970s, the estimations for the mid 2000s range from 30 to 38%
(Lindenboim et al. 2005), suggesting again a substantial increase in inequality.14
Finally, inequality statistics for the period after 1974 can also be derived from
administrative tax sources, as in the previous section of this paper. Figure 1
presented an attempt to reconcile these sources with household survey data—while
not strictly comparable, the top income shares from administrative and survey data
presented roughly the same trends for the overlapping period available.
Themain reference points selected for Fig. 6 depict the evolution of inequality in the
long run, but conceal the volatility that characterized Argentina’s income distribution
along this upward trend. Figure 7 displays theGini coefficient for all the years forwhich
comparable data are available: there are short periods of relative calm, and episodes of
rapid surge in inequality. This volatility contrasts with the relative stability between the
mid 1950s and mid 1970s, based on more limited household surveys. A summary of
these early indicators is presented in Table 2. The growth-incidence curves in Fig. 8
reflect large and non-neutral income changes.15 These income dynamics imply an
increase in inequality.Overall, incomes fell over the 1992–2006 period for all centiles of
the distribution, but the fall was larger for the poor.
This substantial increase in inequality has strong implications. The poverty
headcount ratio in urban Argentina computed with the official moderate poverty line
climbed from 18.5 to 26.7 between 1992 and 2006. It is difficult to explain the
0.30
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0.36
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0.40
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.52
1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2006
Fig. 6 Inequality in Argentina. Gini coefficient—distribution of household per capita income. Greater
Buenos Aires Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH-INDEC
14 In recent years, an increasing share of wages in aggregated income per se has ceased to be an indicator
of diminishing income concentration, since the rise of top wages in English-speaking economies has been
a driving force of the sharp increase in top income shares.
15 As in other parts of this section, the discussion focuses on the period 1992-2006 for which data is
available for urban Argentina, and not for GBA only, unless it is explicitly mentioned.
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increase in poverty without referring to the worsening in the inequality indicators.
The following pages present a narrative of the ups and downs in income inequality
in Argentina from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s.
3.2 An episodic history of inequality since 1974
3.2.1 The first episode: the military regime
The first episode covers the period from 1974 to the early 1980s, encompassing the
last 2 years of a democratic government and the whole dictatorial military regime.16
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
Greater Buenos Aires Argentina
Fig. 7 Inequality. Gini coefficient—distribution of household per capita income. Greater Buenos Aires
and urban Argentina Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH-INDEC
Table 2 Gini Coefficients, 1953–1974 Source: own calculations and Altimir (1986)
Year Source Reference Coverage Gini coefficient
of total
household
income
1953 CONADE-CEPAL CONADE (1965) National 0.400
Non agricultural 0.368
1961 CONADE-CEPAL CONADE (1965) National 0.419
Non agricultural 0.407
1963 EPC (Income and expenditure survey) Altimir (1986) Urban 0.373
GBA 0.358
1969/70 ECIEL (Income and expenditure survey) Altimir (1986) GBA 0.356
1970 EED (Labor force and income survey) Altimir (1986) GBA 0.361
1974 EPH (Labor force and income survey) Altimir (1986) GBA 0.360
16 Even when the first episode should start in 1976, information from the EPH is available first for 1974,
and then from 1980 onwards. Most of the observed distributional changes are attributed to the
developments under the military regime.
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Weak labor institutions, feeble unions, a sweeping trade liberalization reform, and
sharp overall increase in inequality characterize this episode. In March 1976, and by
means of a coup d’e´tat, a military regime came into power. The dictatorial
government suspended collective bargaining, targeted repression at lower level
union leaders, weakened unions, undermined labor institutions, cut down social
policies, and initiated a process of trade liberalization. In that framework, income
disparities grew substantially: the Gini coefficient for the GBA rose from 0.345 in
1974 to 0.430 in 1981. Poverty did not increase much, and the economy grew at an
annual rate of 1.3% per capita between 1976 and 1981.
This episode contains the first of the large macroeconomics crisis that the
economy would suffer over the following 30 years. The banking crisis of 1980 and
the collapse of the managed exchange rate system in 1981 were followed by a large
devaluation and the reversal of capital flows. The situation further deteriorated in
1982, when Mexico’s default on its external debt spread through the region. The
devaluation of 1981 and the liquidity difficulties of 1982 (fueled by the confidence
crisis after the Malvinas war) resulted in a fall of output of around 5% in 1981 and
1982. The Gini coefficient increased significantly by about 3% points and poverty
rose 2 points from 1980 to 1981. Although the Gini fell almost one point from 1981
to 1982, the poverty headcount still increased by 3% points and rose above the 10%
level. The crisis also determined a substantial closing of the economy (imports fell
by 50% in just 2 years), which marks the beginning of a new episode.
3.2.2 The second episode: the 1980s
The second episode comprises most of the decade of 1980, and it is characterized by
the return to democratic rule, a substantially more closed economy, increased union
activity, stronger labor institutions (minimum wage enforcement, collective
bargaining), macroeconomic instability, and a rather stable income distribution.
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Fig. 8 Growth incidence curves Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH-INDEC
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The economy remained rather closed from trade, financial markets and
technological change, even after democratic rule was restored at the end of 1983.
Labor institutions were re-instated, unions regained their power, and social spending
increased, although cash transfers remained low. In this scenario, inequality
remained stable but poverty increased.
The poor macroeconomic performance over this episode is marked by the fact
that capita GDP did not grow between 1982 and 1987, and inflation remained high.
This episode is also characterized by the 1985 recession and the ensuing of the
Austral stabilization plan. Output fell by 9% and poverty increased 2% points in
1985; however, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient fell by three points
with respect to 1984. The 1985 stabilization plan initially managed to reduce
inflation, but it accelerated again in 1986–1988, culminating in two hyperinflation
episodes, one in mid 1989 and another in the first quarter of 1990, which mark the
following episode.
3.2.3 The third episode: hyperinflation
The third episode corresponds to the serious macroeconomic crisis of 1989–1990,
which included two bouts of hyperinflation. It is characterized first by a sharp
increase and a consecutive sudden fall in inequality after the successful stabilization
in 1991. This episode contains the second large increase in income inequality over
the whole period under study. Output fell 11% between 1988 and 1990, and the
annual inflation rates were 343% in 1988, 3080% in 1989 and 2314% in 1990.
The hyperinflation crisis had a large distributional impact: poverty increased by
25% points and the Gini coefficient by 6.3 points between 1988 and 1989, although
it should be noted that inequality had been increasing steadily between the 1985
stabilization and the 1989 hyperinflation-induced jump. The Convertibility Plan,
which established a currency board, marks the subsequent period.
3.2.4 The fourth episode: the 90s
The fourth episode includes most of the decade of 1990, and it is characterized by
relative macroeconomic stability, a currency board with an exchange rate fixed to
the US dollar, and deep structural reforms which implied a much more open and
flexible economy, with weaker labor institutions.17 The income distribution during
the 1990s became substantially more unequal.
In April 1991, the country adopted a currency board with a fixed exchange rate
regime, the Convertibility plan, which managed to curb inflation successfully:
yearly inflation fell from 172% in 1991 to 25% in 1992, and from 1993 until 2001 it
remained at single digit levels. The Convertibility plan was accompanied by a series
of far-reaching structural reforms. The economy grew fast after the implementation
17 This stability refers mainly to the curbing of inflation, which was linked to the fixed exchange rate
regime (currency board) set in place. The opening of the economy to capital flows implied a high degree
of exposure to international fluctuations and to flow reversals, as witnessed by the impact of the
succession of crises in Mexico, South-East Asia, Russia and Brazil. See the section on macro crises below
for more details.
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of the Convertibility plan until 1994, fueled by growing public and private
indebtedness from the liquidity in international capital markets. This fourth episode
can be identified as a period of trade liberalization, intense capital accumulation and
adoption of new technologies, weak labor institutions (lower employment protec-
tion, non-binding minimum wages, among others), weak unions, and increasing
although still small cash transfer programs. The peronist administration imple-
mented a large set of structural reforms including deregulation, liberalization of
trade and of capital markets, privatization of large state-owned enterprises, the
demise of a pay-as-you-go pension system in favor of an individual capitalization
scheme, and several other market-oriented reforms. In that scenario, the economy
started to grow after two decades of stagnation, but inequality went up substantially:
the Gini coefficient for urban Argentina rose from 0.450 in 1992 to 0.504 in 2000.
This episode, while more stable in terms of inflation, was not exempt from
macroeconomic crises. In December 1994, the newly elected government in Mexico
let the currency float, which triggered a capital flight and a financial crisis that
severely affected the Argentine economy. The currency board sustained the drain of
reserves, but the so-called ‘‘Tequila crisis’’ implied a fall in GDP of around 4% in
1995. While growth bounced back quickly after the contagion of the Mexican
financial crisis, the episode had a very large distributional impact: poverty increased
by 5% points and the Gini index by 2.7 points in a year. The effects of the crisis are
also visible in the evolution of the national urban unemployment rate, which soared
from 10.7% in May 1994 to 18.4% in May 1995. Possibly as a consequence of the
reforms, unemployment had already been increasing steadily from 6% in October
1991 (the first measure before the implementation of the Convertibility plan), but it
jumped with the Tequila crisis and remained in double digits until 2007. The crisis
also implied a set of changes in the structure of employment, most notably an
increase in the labor force participation of women and secondary workers, and the
implementation of the Plan Trabajar, a workfare program which would form the
basis for future cash transfer initiatives.18 Contrary to the previous episode,
however, inequality levels and the unemployment rate did not fall during the
recovery. It is possible that the financial crisis acted as a catalyst that accelerated
and amplified the adverse distributive effects of the ongoing reforms. The Tequila
crisis probably exacerbated what was going to be, in any case, a difficult transition
to a post-reform economy. While growth resumed over 1996-1998, inequality levels
only fell slightly.
3.2.5 The fifth episode: the recession and the 2001–2002 crisis
The fifth episode is marked by recession that hit the country in the late 1990s and
the ensuing large macroeconomic crisis in 2001–2002, which triggered an economic
18 For instance, the participation rate of adult women (aged 25-64) increased from 50.8 to 53.3 percent
from 1994 to 1995, while it remained fairly stable for men in the same age group (91 and 91.3 percent).
For the same years, the employment rate for adult women was stable at 45.1 percent, but it decreased
from 83.5 to 80.6 percent for adult men, which is reflected in the unemployment rates increases from 11.2
to 15.4 for women and 11.8 to 12.3 for men. The participation rate for adults over 65 also increased
throughout the period (CEDLAS, 2011).
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meltdown and the devaluation of the currency. This episode is characterized by a
sharp increase in inequality.
After the recovery from the Tequila crisis, growth resumed fairly strongly in
1996–1998. Policy inconsistencies (such as electoral spending and debt sustain-
ability issues related to the transition to the fully funded pension system), the
exhaustion of the currency board, and an unfavorable international scenario
deepened a recession which started in 1999 and triggered a large crisis at the end of
2001. The continuing exposure to international capital flows brought about by the
fixed exchange rate regime and the liberalization of the capital account hit the
economy at the end of the millennium, with impacts from the 1997 financial crisis in
South-East Asia and the 1998 crisis in Russia. In January 1999, the latter resulted in
the devaluation of Brazil’s currency, Argentina’s largest trading partner. The
economy entered a period of recession, which culminated in a major economic,
banking and financial crisis in December 2001. The currency board finally collapsed
after restrictions were imposed on withdrawal of funds from the banks, which
triggered a devaluation of the currency. The meltdown resulted in a dramatic fall in
output and employment: per capita GDP fell 17% between 2000 and 2002, and
unemployment climbed to 19%.
Over this period, changes in inequality were dominated by the macro situation.
The recession and the ensuing crisis had a large impact: the Gini coefficient, for
instance, increased 4 percentage points between 1999 and 2002. The most dramatic
effect was the combination of the jump in prices (due to the exchange rate pass
through) and falling nominal incomes (due to the sharp fall in economic activity),
which implied a jump in the official poverty rate from 38.3% in October 2001 to
53% in May 2002.
3.2.6 The sixth episode: the 2003–2007 recovery
The sixth episode started around 2003 with the rapid growth in the aftermath of the
crisis, and lasted until 2008, with the development of a major international financial
crisis that globally affected growth, commodity prices, and other relevant factors for
Argentina. The average annual growth rate was unprecedentedly high, at 8%
between 2003 and 2007, while the unemployment rate plummeted from almost 20 to
8%. Poverty and inequality indicators fell continuously during the same period. The
Gini coefficient reached in 2006 approximately the same level as in the second half
of the 1990s, before the start of the 1999–2001 recession.
The strong macroeconomic performance determined the evolution of all
socioeconomic indicators during the sixth episode. The fast economic recovery
was propitiated by the new structure of relative prices that emerged from the strong
devaluation of the peso in 2002: the fall in real wages increased the competitiveness
of Argentina’s products and deterred imports. New taxes and a default on the
government’s debt allowed a fiscal surplus that helped stabilize the economy. The
social unrest and the political instability of 2001–2002 were curbed by a new and
stronger government from the traditional peronist party (2002–2003), with the help
of large cash transfer programs displaying rather wide coverage. Moreover, the
period saw a large increase in the prices of the commodities exported by the
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country. These exceptional conditions in the international markets were also a key
factor in the recovery. The Kirchner administration (2003–2007) did not innovate
much from the economic policies inherited from the interim Duhalde’s presidency.
However, it strengthened labor institutions by supporting the bargaining power of
unions and innovating in cash transfer programs.
The main characteristics of this episode include the adjustment of economic
agents to the new relative prices implied by the devaluation (and later, depreciation,
given that a dirty floating was adopted), stronger labor institutions and a more
extensive safety net. Inequality fell rapidly and substantially to pre-crisis levels over
this period. Several factors combined to create a scenario where inequality fell over
this episode: (1) the stabilization of the economy and the recovery from the crisis
2001–2002; (2) realignments in wages after the devaluation of the peso, (3) a strong
employment expansion; (4) lower import competition and productive changes due
to the new relative prices, which helped (through the devaluation) unskilled labor
intensive industries; (5) slower technical upgrading, due in part to the change in the
relative price of imported capital goods; (6) stronger labor institutions, stronger
unions and pro-worker labor policies, with increases in the minimum wage and
mandated lump sum increases in wages; and (7) a more extensive safety net, with
the deployment in 2002 of a large emergency cash transfer program to the poor,
which covered up to 20% of the households in the country.
3.2.7 A typology of episodes since the late 20th century
The six proposed episodes can be classified into three types: (1) periods of serious
macroeconomic crisis (episodes 3 and 5), (2) periods of liberalization with weak
labor institutions (episodes 1 and 4), and (3) episodes of low import penetration and
stronger labor institutions (episodes 2 and 6). Inequality seems to have fluctuated
widely under type-1 episodes, increased in a rather permanent way under type-2
episodes, and decreased or remained stable under type-3 episodes.
3.3 Determinants of the evolution of inequality
As the discussion of the episodes highlighted, there are clear differences with
respect to the evolution of the income distribution. Figure 9 reproduces the pattern
of the Gini coefficient and GDP per capita, and delimits the six episodes. Table 3 in
turn characterizes these episodes in terms of five elements: (1) macroeconomic
performance, (2) openness to international trade, (2) technological change and
physical capital accumulation, (3) unions and labor institutions, and (5) social
protection. Changes in the income distribution are the result of a vast array of
factors, so any simple classification excludes potentially relevant explanations. The
five factors in Table 3 have two elements in common: they have close theoretical
links with changes in the income distribution, and they have been extensively
invoked in the distributional literature in Argentina. The following pages first
describe the stylized facts behind the increase in inequality over the period, and then
review the evidence on each of the factors listed in Table 3.
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3.3.1 Stylized facts: returns to skills, sectoral changes and supply factors
The first relevant factor is the evolution of the returns to human capital. Figure 10
illustrates the changes in the returns to education in the context of multivariate wage
regressions for the years 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998 and 2006.19 These results are based
on relatively stable years, to isolate the impact of crises and to focus on the impact
of these factors on the trend in inequality. The results in Fig. 10 indicate that the gap
between primary school and secondary school graduates did not change much over
time. However, the gap between college graduates and the rest fell over the 1980s,
but then strongly increased in the 1990s. This is confirmed by Gasparini and Cruces
(2008) based on a microsimulation approach, who find that inequality in hourly
wages and earnings diminished in the 1980s (ignoring the macro crisis of the late
1980s), driven by a fall in the returns to education in terms of hourly wages.
Conversely, during the 1990s the returns to education became highly unequalizing.
According to the microsimulation results, the overall effect of returns to education
accounts for 4.6 points out of the 8.4 point-increase in the Gini for the equivalized
household income distribution. These results suggest that unskilled workers lost in
terms of hourly wages and hours of work during the 1990s, and that these changes
had a very significant role in shaping the distribution of hourly wages, earnings and
household income. The discussion of the determinants of inequality changes below
pays particular attention to this phenomenon.
The second stylized fact is the evolution of the relative supply of skilled workers.
The simplest explanation for the change in the wage gap between the skilled and the
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unskilled relies on changes in the relative supply and demand for both types of
workers. Specifically, the skill premium may widen if the relative supply of skilled
labor falls. The evidence for Argentina, in fact, reveals a strong increase in the
relative supply of semi-skilled (high school graduates) and skilled (college
graduates) workers, to the detriment of those with lower levels of skills (those
with less than a high school degree). Gasparini and Cruces (2008) show that 78.6%
of adults aged 20–65 were unskilled in GBA in 1974, but that their share fell
significantly to 47.1% in 2006. For the semi-skilled, the share rose from 17.6 to
37%, and for the skilled from 3.8 to 15.9%. These patterns are even more
pronounced when considering the share in employment or in aggregate labor.
The strong increase in the relative supply of college graduates would have driven
down the wage skill premium if factor demands had not changed. This appears to
have happened in the 1980s, but not in the 1990s. Instead, in the decade of 1990 the
college wage premium rose sharply, which suggests an increase in the demand for
skilled workers that more than offset the downward pressures from its increased
supply.
A third stylized fact refers to the sectoral distribution of workers. Argentina’s
economy experienced large changes in its productive and employment structure
over the period under study. Gasparini and Cruces (2008) discuss the evolution of
the shares in aggregate labor by economic sector in Greater Buenos Aires since
1974. The most noticeable change in the labor structure since the 1970s was the fall
in employment in the manufacturing industry, and the increase in skilled services
(public sector and professional and business services). While in 1974 39% of
employment was in the manufacturing industry, the value dropped to just 17% in
2006. On the other hand, while in 1974 21% of employment was in the more skilled-
intensive sectors of professional and business services and the government, that
share rose to 41 percent in 2006. These patterns do not vary substantially when
dividing the population of workers by skills.
The change in income inequality thus occurred against a backdrop of an increase
in the wage skill premium, in the relative supply of skilled workers, and on
increased use of skilled labor across economic sectors. The rest of the section
reviews the plausible determinants of these observed trends.
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Fig. 10 Returns to education Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH-INDEC
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3.3.2 Macroeconomic factors: hyperinflation, meltdown and adjustment
The macroeconomic performance of Argentina has been characterized by low growth,
and high volatility from the early 1970s to themid 2000s. Table 4 provides data on a set
of related indicators. The macroeconomic performance is usually associated with the
central position of the income distribution, and hence with poverty. In contrast, its links
to inequality are not unambiguous orwell established in the economic literature, since it
is not the case that the benefits fromgrowth (or the costs of recessions) are equally shared
along the income distribution. However, in most cases large macroeconomic crisis—in
terms of high inflation and output and employment falls—are associated with
unequalizing changes, because households in the lower end of the distribution have
relatively less access to income smoothing and insurance devices.20
The inequality dynamics in periods of economic turbulence are largely governed by
themacroeconomic situation (seeTable 5).Argentina suffered two large crises from the
mid-1970s to themid-2000swith substantial effects on the incomedistribution. Figure 9
depicts the sudden and large falls in GDP per capita. While the relationship is not a
perfect fit, there seems to be a clear negative correlation between the evolution of GDP
and inequality indicators during the episodes of crisis and recovery. This is clearly
visible during the crises of episodes 3 and 5, and the recovery of episode 6.
Understanding and accounting for crises are relevant, first and foremost because
of their large negative effect on household welfare, which has been documented
elsewhere.21 In terms of their effect on inequality, the following paragraphs
concentrate on the mechanisms determining the differential impact of crises along
the income distribution, and on the channels through which they can have a
permanent effect on its shape.
From themacroeconomy-distribution perspective, the two largest crises (1989–1991
and 2001–2002) represent the most interesting episodes over the period, since they
present unusually large falls in GDP and simultaneously large distributional impacts.22
Under these two large crises, the evolution of poverty and inequality was dominated by
the combination of falling output and sudden increases in prices, although the
inflationary processes were fundamentally different in nature during both crises.23
20 The 1995 crisis in Mexico seems to be an exception. Sze´kely (2005) reports that inequality actually
fell between 1994 and 1996, because the reduction in income over all the population was largest among
the richest households.
21 See for instance the discussion for Latin America and the Caribbean in Lustig (2000) and the
comparative discussion of the impact of financial crises in the region and South-East Asia in Fallon and
Lucas (2002).
22 The recession preceding the Austral stabilization plan in 1985 was not associated to large increases in
inequality. Also, as stated above, the lasting effects of the Tequila crises cannot be disentangled from
those of the host of reforms taking place simultaneously.
23 The devaluation in early 2002 implied a jump in the price level to accommodate the new relative
prices of the economy. The inflation in the 2003-2007 period, although increasing, was moderate when
compared to the hyperinflations of 1989 and 1991. It was mostly due to the expansive monetary policy,
the growing levels of employment and the adjustment of the real exchange rate to its equilibrium level
after the devaluation’s overshooting in a context of a dirty floating exchange rate regime. Contrary to the
experience of the 1980 s, government financing through the inflationary tax did not seem to be a major
force behind the changes in the price index.
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Given the fiscal origin of most high inflation and hyperinflation bouts
(Heymann and Leijonhufvud 1995), it is not surprising that the literature
concentrates on the differential incidence of the inflation tax.24 Ahumada et al.
(1993, 2000) have quantified the distributional effects of inflation in Argentina
Table 4 Main economic indicators Source: World Development Indicators and Ministerio de Economı´a-
Repu´blica Argentina
GDP growth (%) Inflation (%) Real Exchange Rate (2000 = 100) Unemployment rate (%)
1976 -2.0 444 148.6 4.0
1977 6.9 176 167.0 2.3
1978 -4.5 176 127.3 1.9
1979 10.2 160 90.4 2.1
1980 4.2 101 71.3 2.3
1981 -5.7 104 92.1 5.0
1982 -5.0 165 217.5 3.7
1983 3.9 344 205.5 3.1
1984 2.2 627 189.5 3.6
1985 -7.6 672 226.1 4.9
1986 7.9 90 189.8 4.8
1987 2.9 131 193.6 5.2
1988 -2.6 343 185.5 5.7
1989 -7.5 3080 295.8 7.0
1990 -2.4 2314 148.8 6.0
1991 12.7 172 111.6 5.3
1992 11.9 25 95.7 6.7
1993 5.9 11 89.8 9.6
1994 5.8 4 88.4 13.1
1995 -2.8 3 88.0 17.4
1996 5.5 0 90.4 18.8
1997 8.1 1 92.1 14.3
1998 3.9 1 92.6 13.3
1999 -3.4 -1 95.8 14.4
2000 -0.8 -1 100.0 14.7
2001 -4.4 -1 103.9 19.0
2002 -10.9 26 257.0 18.8
2003 8.8 13 219.4 16.7
2004 9.0 4 217.4 13.6
2005 9.2 10 203.6 11.2
2006 8.0 7 208.3 10.6
24 Inflation constitutes by definition a proportional tax on nominal balances, but its effect on the income
distribution is neutral only if all households face the same inflation rate, if all households have the same
income elasticity in their demand for money, or if they all have access to the same ‘‘inflation-protection’’
technologies. Theoretical models have been developed by Bulir (1998) and Sturzenegger (1997), among
others.
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from a tax-incidence perspective. Recurring to similar methodologies, both
studies estimate monetary demand functions, aggregate inflation tax and
seigniorage collection, and re-weight the consumer price index by quintile of
the income distribution based on the 1987 Household Expenditure Survey. An
interesting finding from Ahumada et al. (2000) is that quintile-specific inflation
rates do not differ much. However, the results indicate that inflation tax as a
proportion of income was about twice as large for households in the first quintile
as for those in the fifth quintile over the 1980–1990 period. The impact of the
inflation tax on aggregate inequality indicators was comparatively small for high
inflation periods, with increases of about 1–1.5 points of the Gini for 1980–1988
and 1990, but extremely large for the year 1989—the inflation tax would imply
an increase of 3.4 points in the Gini coefficient.
The available evidence on the impact of hyperinflation on inequality in Argentina
suggests a relatively large regressive (and thus inequality increasing) effect.
However, this impact should be short lived, since successful stabilization programs
often reduce inflation rates drastically. This seems to be confirmed by the
1991–1993 trend of the Gini coefficient (Fig. 9).
The other major episode of macroeconomic crisis was induced by the implosion
of the currency board regime in December 2001 and the subsequent financial and
economic meltdown, which was particularly virulent even by Argentine standards.
Its impact on income inequality has been widely documented. Using a specific
survey implemented by the World Bank in the midst of the crisis (June and July
2002), Fiszbein and Galiani (2003) report that almost half of the households
suffered a fall in nominal income; they also observe a change in household roles
with respect to the labor market, with higher employment among secondary workers
as a strategy to complement the fall in income from unemployed (or working
reduced-hours) primary workers. Other coping strategies reflected in the survey
include relying on the help of family and friends, reducing consumption of non-
basic goods and switching to cheaper products. As in other crises in Latin America,
the extremely high level of unemployment implied that school enrollment did not
fall significantly among younger children, and only slightly among those aged
16–18.25
Table 5 Macroeconomic crisis
changes in output, poverty and
inequality Source: own
calculations based on National
Accounts and EPH
Crisis Output (%) Changes
Poverty (%) Inequality
1982 -5 3 -0.7
1985 -9 2 -3
1989 -11 25 6.3
1995 -4 5 2.7
2002 -17 24 3.6
25 CEDLAS (2008) reports small but positive increases in enrollment rates between 2001 and 2003 for
virtually all age groups, from 3 to 23.
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One key component of the crisis was a large bank deposit freeze and liquidity
restriction, which in principle has an ambiguous direct distributional effect.26 Halac
and Schmukler (2004) find that the probability of having savings was positively and
significantly associated with measures of income (Bebczuk 2008 reports similar
evidence for other countries in the region). Interestingly, however, the authors also
find that, among those with savings, the less educated and those with lower incomes
had a larger probability of being affected by the bank deposit freeze, which implies
that the measure probably had a positive effect on inequality.
While other aspects of the 2001–2002 episode have been studied [see Gasparini
and Cruces (2008), for more details], the available evidence clearly states that the
poor in Argentina were more affected by crises than the non-poor. However, most of
the inequality-increasing factors tend to dissipate relatively quickly, through the
increase in employment and income levels in the recovery periods. In the two
episodes of large crisis, inequality first jumped but then fell considerably right after
the stabilization. There is a debate on the existence of hysteresis effects on
inequality from the crises (Lustig 2000), but there does not seem to be definitive
empirical evidence for Argentina. While the Tequila crisis might have had
permanent effects on the income distribution, it is likely that this was due to the
acceleration of the negative aspects of the underlying reform process. Moreover,
any permanent effects of the 2001–2002 crisis are difficult to evaluate, since they
are confounded with the strong recovery from 2003 onwards. The argument of a
permanent reduction in the stock of general human capital does not seem to apply in
the latter case, given the aforementioned evidence on non-falling school enrollment,
although other subtler mechanisms might be in place.27
Finally, regarding the importance of macroeconomic factors for income
distribution beyond episodes of crises, a current of the literature attributes the
bulk of the increase in inequality in the 1990s in Argentina to the impact of
macroeconomic adjustment and the resulting reduction in the aggregate demand for
labor (Gonza´lez and Mene´ndez 2000; Altimir et al. 2002; Frenkel and Gonzalez
Rozada 2002; Damill et al. 2003; Beccaria 2006). However, as argued by Gasparini
and Cruces (2008), the direct distributional effect of the increase in unemployment
in the 1990s seems to be of second order, as it is mainly accounted for by the raise in
labor market participation.28 The effects of unemployment and adjustment are not
mutually exclusive (and might even be complementary) to explanations based on
the impact of trade liberalization and skill-biased technical change.
26 While no empirical analysis has attempted to link the two phenomena, it is widely believed that the
restrictions on withdrawing cash from banks had a poverty and inequality increasing effect by starving the
cash (or informal) economy.
27 While no empirical analysis has attempted to link the two phenomena, it is widely believed that the
restrictions on withdrawing cash from banks had a poverty and inequality increasing effect by starving the
cash (or informal) economy.
28 The increase in unemployment may have depressed wages for those employed, especially among the
unskilled and the semi-skilled, which bore the largest increase in joblessness, and this might have
contributed to a higher wage premium and increased inequality, although there is no systematic evidence
on the strength of this phenomenon in Argentina.
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3.3.3 Trade liberalization, technical change and capital incorporation:
implications for income inequality in the Argentine case
The relationship between international trade and inequality has long been a key
issue in Economics. The degree of openness of a country is a crucial determinant of
its price structure, and hence of the structure of employment and factor
remunerations. The paper by Galiani and Somaini in this special collection presents
a model of these aspects of the Argentine economy during the 20th century,
highlighting the political economy factors behind the drives for integration to the
world economy. While this model provides the political economy backdrop for the
relationship between trade and evolution of inequality discussed in this section, the
evidence presented below is partly based on the discussion by Brambilla, Galiani
and Porto, also in this special collection. These authors review the history of
Argentine trade policy and its relationship with distributional conflict, international
conditions and the country’s fundamental comparative advantage in agriculture.
In terms of the analytic narrative of this section, the two periods of large
increases in inequality in Argentina (besides the large macro crises), episodes 1 and
4, coincide with an explicit pursue of trade liberalization. More import competition
might have induced a reduction in the relative demand for industries that were
intensive in unskilled labor, and thus increased overall inequality through increasing
skill premia.
The conventional wisdom in economic theory is that unskilled labor, the
relatively abundant factor in developing economies, would benefit from trade
reform and thus inequality would fall, although these reforms usually have more
complex effects (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004, 2007). As a middle-income country,
the case for Argentina was not clear-cut ex ante, especially since the country’s
relative abundance might correspond to natural resources, which are complementary
to capital and skilled labor, and not to unskilled labor (Berlinski 1994; Galiani and
Porto 2008). The impact of trade liberalization on the distribution of income is
ultimately an empirical question.
The evidence for Argentina suggests overwhelmingly that the episodes of trade
liberalization led to an increase in inequality. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) were
among the first to find evidence of an unequalizing effect of the trade reforms of the
1990s. They find that in sectors where import penetration was deeper, the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled widened, although this factor can explain only 10
percent of the total change in the wage premium. While most of the studies on trade
and inequality have concentrated in specific episodes (the short-lived liberalization
of the 1970s in the earlier literature, and the reforms of the 1990s more recently), the
study by Galiani and Porto (2008) extends over 1974–2001, spanning five of the six
‘‘episodes’’, with consecutive periods of protection and liberalization (see Fig. 11
for a time series of the average tariff and the average skill premium in their data).
The analysis, based on the impact of sectoral tariffs on the wage skill premium,
indicates that the level of tariffs has a positive and significant effect on the wages of
unskilled labor, no significant effect on semi-skilled (high school graduates) labor,
and a negative impact on the returns to higher education. Taken together, this
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evidence implies that the trade liberalization episodes increased skill premia and
thus contributed to higher overall income inequality in Argentina.29
The general conclusion from these and other studies on the distributive impact of
trade liberalization in Argentina is that, while more openness implied a wider wage
gap and thus higher levels of earnings inequality, its effects can explain a significant
fraction of the total increase in the wage premium, but the unexplained part is still
large.
The recent literature on income distribution dynamics stresses the importance of
technical change and capital incorporation as alternatives (or complements) of the
trade liberalization channel. The third factor in Table 3 combines changes in
production and organizational technologies, and physical capital accumulation.
Both factors are usually associated with a bias towards skilled labor, driving
inequality in the labor market. The relevance of this hypothesis for Argentina is
confirmed by the evidence linking the large increase in inequality in the 1990s to a
shock in the adoption of new technologies, either directly or through its
incorporation via capital and international trade.
Some of the plausible concurrent factors behind the large increase in income
inequality in Argentina during the decade of 1990 can be derived from the
extensions to the standard trade model. Many of the arguments and the evidence
point towards the importance of technology and capital accumulation (Goldberg and
Pavcnik 2004, 2007). Skill-biased technological change (SBTC), which might arise
endogenously from increased trade, and the incorporation of technology through the
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Fig. 11 Trends in tariffs and the wage premium. Author’s calculations based on historical trade data and
labor surveys (EPH). Tariff: average tariff across all 3-digit ISIC sectors, weighted by employment in
each sector. Skilled wage premium: coefficients on the skilled dummy in different earnings regressions
per year. See Galiani and Porto (2008); for more details Source: Galiani and Porto (2008)
29 It must be stressed that, as is the case in all the literature covering the relationship between trade an
inequality, the analysis is almost exclusively focused on earnings and not on overall income.
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process of capital accumulation might have occurred concurrently to trade reform in
Argentina.
The theoretical arguments are relatively straightforward and have been formal-
ized in Krusell et al. (2000), Acemoglu (2002) and (2006). Technological and
organizational changes that increase the relative productivity of skilled workers
translate into wider wage gaps and, with labor market rigidities, also into lower
employment for the unskilled. An increase in the use of physical capital in the
production process becomes unequalizing through two channels. First, if capital
goods incorporate embedded technological change, an increase in investment in
new machinery and equipment can accelerate the adoption of new technologies.
Second, even without technical innovations, physical capital is usually more
complementary to skilled labor, being then a source of an increasing productivity
gap across workers with different education levels. The arguments are compelling,
but their empirical relevance for changes in inequality must be established.
Since the mid 1950s and until the mid 1970s, Argentina was a relatively closed
economy with low investment rates. The political turmoil of the 1970s and the
stagnant, unstable and protected economy of the 1980s discouraged investment in
physical capital, especially foreign investment. A new scenario emerged in the
1990s, combining macroeconomic stability and a set of market-oriented policies,
including a massive process of privatizations and deregulations, and measures
toward capital account liberalization. On top of that, the real exchange rate
appreciation and the large tariff reductions substantially reduced the relative price of
physical capital. The favorable international financial conditions also contributed to
the massive inflow of foreign capitals. Technology and organizational changes are
difficult to measure, and in Argentina they occurred in a period with several policy
changes and economic shocks. The evidence in favor of these hypotheses is mostly
indirect. Private investment as a proportion of GDP increased strongly between the
1980s and the 1990s. In particular, foreign direct investment as a share of GDP
increased from an average of 0.4% in the period 1970-1990 to 1.6% in the period
1991–1997. According to FIEL (2002), the physical capital stock (excluding the
public sector) grew by 20% between 1992 and 1999. The average age of the capital
stock decreased from 8.8 years in 1989 to 5.2 years in 1998. This rapid increase in
physical capital, particularly of imported machinery and equipment, was a vehicle
for technology modernization after decades of backwardness.
The deregulation of many domestic markets and the removal of barriers to
international trade forced private firms to seek the productivity gains necessary to
stay in business. Besides, the openness of the Argentine economy occurred just in a
moment of increasing globalization and diffusion of new communication and
information technologies, inducing firms to adopt state-of-the-art production
technologies. Many sectors went through radical changes in their production
processes, incorporating information technology, computers, robots and modern
assembly lines in just a few years.30 These changes also occurred at the
organizational level. There was an extraordinary transformation in the property
30 See Bisang et al. (1996), Kosacoff (1998), Katz (2000) and Bisang and Go´mez (2006).
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structure of firms from public to private, from domestic to foreign, and from small to
large owners.
Both technological and organizational changes implied a lower relative demand
for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The impact on these workers could have
been milder if changes had been adopted gradually, or in a context of strong social
protection with compensatory measures. That was not the case: the modernization
of Argentina’s economy took place in just a few years in a scenario of weak labor
institutions, and in the midst of a process of labor deregulation.
A sectoral decomposition of changes in the share of employment by educational
groups (Gasparini and Cruces 2008) suggests that the fall in the relative
employment of unskilled workers is mainly accounted for by a drop in the intensity
of use of this factor within all economic sectors. The ‘‘within’’ effect is particularly
relevant in the period 1992–1998, which is consistent with the story of
technological/organizational shock in the 1990s. With skilled-biased technological
change, the increase in the stock of more educated workers can be easily absorbed in
each sector, consistent with a strong increase in the intensity of use of skilled labor
in most sectors of the economy. The skill upgrading in production processes was
particularly strong in basic and high tech manufacturing sectors, but also in
commerce and public administration. Moreover, the observed changes in the returns
to education, which favored skilled workers, are also compatible with the
SBTC/capital accumulation hypothesis. The returns to observed and unobserved
skills substantially increased in the 1990s (and not in the 1980s); a fact that is
consistent with a technological shock driving changes in both returns.
Acosta and Gasparini (2007) present evidence of the relationship between capital
accumulation and the wage structure by taking advantage of the variability of wage
premia and capital investment across industries in Argentina’s manufacturing
sectors. The results suggest that sectors that accumulated more physical capital in
the 1990s were those where the wage premium grew the most. In related work,
Bustos (2006) assesses the impact of trade and foreign investment on technology
and skill upgrading at the firm level. This study shows that aggregate skill intensity
in the manufacturing sector is almost entirely accounted for by skill upgrading
within firms. Moreover, the paper shows that firms that upgraded technology faster
also upgraded skills faster.
The profound trade and capital account liberalization process of the 1990s was
probably a relevant factor in fostering the rapid adoption of new technologies
through the capital/technology and trade/technology channels, and these effects
might have been larger than the ‘‘pure’’ trade channel covered previously.
The main hypothesis behind the increase in inequality in many developed
countries, skill-biased technological change, seems to be present in Argentina. First,
changes occurred not only in production technologies, but also in the way of
organizing economic activity, including substantial changes in firm size and
ownership structure. Second, unlike other countries where changes were introduced
gradually, Argentina experienced a shock in the way production was carried out,
due to the sudden openness of the economy. Thirdly, the overvaluation of the
exchange rate and the global transition towards intensive use of information
technologies coincided, driving the adoption of state-of-the-art equipment and
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processes. Finally, as discussed below, changes occurred in a framework of weak
labor and social institutions. It should be noted, however, that while several studies
suggest the empirical relevance of the argument discussed in this section, there is no
conclusive evidence on the overall quantitative importance of this hypothesis.
3.3.4 Labor institutions
Labor institutions encompass labor taxation and regulation, freedom of unioniza-
tion, forms of collective bargaining, minimum wages and other subtler active labor
market policies that might reinforce the bargaining power of employees. The
literature in general agrees on the equalizing effect of these factors, at least in the
short run, although the range of impact estimates is very ample.
The area of labor taxation and regulation was targeted by the first Menem
administration in the early 1990s. It introduced a sweeping program of payroll tax
reductions, explicitly motivated by the belief that lower taxes would reduce
unemployment and promote formalization of the labor market.31 The government
considered these reductions to be compensatory measures, and thus mandated larger
cuts for less developed areas. Cruces et al. 2010, however, report that the reductions
had no significant effects on levels of local employment (the purpose of the reform),
although the reductions were partially shifted to higher wages. This limited increase
in wages implies that the distributional effect should be minor, but with an
ambiguous direction: on the one hand, poorer regions received larger cuts, so they
should see the largest wage increases (reduction in between region inequality). On
the other hand, the cuts only benefited formal workers, potentially increasing
within-region inequality.
There has also been some discussion in the literature about the distributive
impact of minimum wage levels and their change. The minimum wage was an
important variable bargained over by government and unions in the inflationary
1980s because it constituted a centralized device for recouping the erosion of price
increases on the purchasing power of wages. In that sense, it is likely that through
this channel increases in the minimum wage had an equalizing effect. The low
inflation rates in 1993–2001 implied a loss of relevance of the minimum wage,
which was fixed in nominal terms at a low level from August 1993 to June 2003,
and largely not binding over most of the period. The minimum wage increased
substantially from July 2003, coinciding with the recovery of the economy, and it
probably had an equalizing effect over the recovery period.
The partial review of the previous paragraphs shows that the distributional impact
of labor policies and reform during the 1990s is not a settled issue. Most of the
31 Neffa (2005) provides an exhaustive description of all the changes introduced in this and other aspects
of labor regulation in the 1989-2001 period. The Menem administration also introduced a series of so-
called ‘‘flexible’’ wage contracts (modalidades promovidas), which allowed firms to legally hire workers
with reduced entitlements (such as the reduction or the removal of severance payments for some
categories, or rebates in social security contributions), or to make extensive use of trial periods and
internships. While these measures certainly implied lower labor standards for registered workers, it is not
evident to isolate their distributional impact from the contemporaneous trends in labor markets, marked
by increasing unemployment and informality, and from concurrent reforms. Cruces, Galiani and Kidyba
(2010) analyze the impact of reductions in payroll taxes on wages and employment.
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measures were qualified as anti-labor, and the increase in employment and
efficiency that justified them failed to materialize in many cases. However,
disentangling the effect of each policy from that of concurrent reforms in the labor
market and elsewhere might prove impossible.
The Argentine labor market (and political landscape) has been characterized by
the presence of strong, industry wide unions, which played a significant role in
shaping the country’s social, economic and political outlook, mainly through their
relation with the peronist party. Despite the importance of unions in the Argentine
economy, there is only limited empirical evidence on their impact on wages and
income, mostly because of data availability issues.32
There is a broad consensus about the inequality-reducing effects of the first Pero´n
government’s pro-labor policies, in which the previous (relatively scattered) unions
were centralized and greatly strengthened.33 From the 1940s to the 1950s union
membership increased markedly, from 30 to 51–65% for manufacturing workers,
and from 24 to 38–41% for non-agricultural workers (Marshall 2005). After this
initial consolidation of large unions, it is highly likely that unions also had an
overall equalizing effect in the 1950–1970 period, as in more advanced economies.
The low levels of informality and high levels of union membership warranted a
large fraction of beneficiaries from union activities, and the presence of high tariffs
implied a relative abundance of rents to share (and to fight for). Moreover, unions
also played an important role in inflationary periods, by helping regain the losses in
the purchasing power of wages (which are in fact temporary rents enjoyed by firms).
While consistent series of union membership are not available, the evolution of
coverage and strength for 1970–1983 can be deducted from qualitative sources.34 In
broad terms, unions were only relatively weakened by the authoritarian govern-
ments at the beginning of the 1970s, and regained a substantial political and formal
power with the return to democratic rule (and to a Peronist government) in 1973.
The military coup of 1976 and the ensuing military regime of 1976–1983 implied an
important retreat of unions from the labor market, and the persecution of middle and
low rank union representatives at the workplace. From 1984 onwards, with the
return to democratic rule, it is possible to observe the evolution of union influence
from the available data on number of strikes and days lost to industrial action
[(figures for 1984–2006 can be constructed from Murillo (1997), and Etchemendy
and Collier (2007)]. These figures show a high degree of union activity and
volatility during the 1980s, receding greatly from 1991 onwards, and then growing
again after 2001. Union membership also declined between 1990 and 2001
(Marshall 2005). These trends are suggestive of a series of factors.
32 The EPH, an otherwise fine labor force survey, has never routinely collected information on union
membership.
33 The overall distributive effect of unions depends on the characteristics of union members, which is an
empirical question. Membership premia might have equalizing effects if members are unskilled, low
income workers, while the contrary is also possible if members are mostly skilled or semi-skilled. This is
especially relevant in latter periods, with a labor force characterized by higher levels of informal workers.
34 Marshall (2005) presents an informed discussion of the trend in unionization rates in Argentina in the
period 1940-2000. The series cannot be presented without this discussion, because the available indicators
are not comparable per se; therefore, interested readers are referred to the original article.
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The decline in union activity coincides with reforms such as privatizations, trade
liberalization and price stabilization of the 1990s, which at least in theory greatly
reduced the power of unions. This is due to the dissipation of rents from inefficient
state-owned enterprises, from protective tariffs and from the inflation-induced rents
and subsequent wage bargaining (Marshall 2002, highlights price stabilization as the
loss of a common standard for collective bargaining in this period). The decline in
union activity during the 1990s, thus, coincided with a period of rising wage
inequality and with factors that according to the evidence reviewed contributed to
this rise in wage inequality.
3.3.5 Cash transfers and poverty reduction programs
The previous sections analyzed the level and the evolution of inequality from the
mid-1970s to the mid-2000s in Argentina, and covered a host of potential
determinants of the major changes observed throughout the period. The influence of
the state in most explanations was pervasive but indirect, operating mainly through
major reforms. Social protection affects income distribution in more straightforward
ways. In particular, the impact of cash transfers is directly reflected in income
inequality statistics. This section focuses on the direct effect of cash transfer policies
and poverty reduction programs.35
As described by Gasparini and Cruces (2008), the structure of public social
expenditure changed in the period under analysis. The growth in the share of cash
transfers from social assistance and emergency employment programs represented
the main change, increasing from 15 to 25%. This increase was due to the new
workfare programs in the mid 1990s, and to the implementation of a large
emergency cash transfer program after the 2001–2002 crisis, the Programa Jefes y
Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (PJJHD). The program covered around 2 million
households (about 20% of all households in the country). As the economy
recovered, the coverage of the program fell to 1.4 million beneficiaries in 2007.36
Gasparini and Cruces (2008) report that the distributional impact of this program
has been small, although not negligible—it accounted for a reduction of around 1
Gini percentage point in 2006, and seemed to contrast with the widespread adoption
of massive targeted conditional cash transfer programs in the region. However, the
economic history of Argentina reviewed in this special collection indicates that
groundbreaking policy innovations happen often in the country. In 2009, the
Fernandez de Kirchner administration announced the ‘‘Asignacio´n Universal por
Hijo’’ program, which expanded the coverage of family allowances to the children
of the unemployed and informal workers. The expansion in this benefit’s coverage
35 Gasparini and Cruces (2008) present a full benefit incidence analysis of taxation and public social
expenditure. They find that fiscal policy reduces the level of inequality, but it does not have a significant
impact in its evolution over the last decades. This result is driven by the fact that changes in the
distributional impact of fiscal policy were small compared to inequality changes driven by ‘‘market’’
forces.
36 The new programs Familias por la Inclusio´n Social and Seguro de Capacitacio´n y Empleo gained
relevance as successors to the PJJHD, but the latter was still the one with the highest number of
beneficiaries in 2008. See Cruces and Gasparini (2008) for details on these programs.
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resulted in its virtual universalization, and the level of benefits and coverage of the
program placed it among the most significant in the region (Gasparini and Cruces
2010).
3.4 Changes in income inequality in a comparative perspective, 1970s
to 2000s
The increase in inequality in Argentina from the mid 1970s to the mid 2000s was
comparatively large by international standards. This section documents the pattern
of income inequality in Argentina with respect to selected Latin American
countries. Because of data availability and comparability issues, most of the
evidence corresponds to the period 1992–2006.
Although economic historians have conducted research about inequality in
socioeconomic indicators in Latin America and the Caribbean from as early as the
15th century [see Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), Robinson and Sokoloff (2004)
and Williamson (2009)], systematic data on the personal income distribution only
became available in the 1970s, when several countries in the region introduced
household survey programs. However, the early surveys were not implemented at
periodic intervals, they were usually restricted to main cities, they collected only
limited information about income, and their questionnaires and sampling frames
changed over time. This implies that the information available for the 1970s and the
1980s is less comparable than for the latter period [see Altimir (1996), London˜o and
Sze´kely (2000) and Gasparini (2003), for reviews of this early evidence].
The literature suggests that in the 1970s inequality fell in several countries—such
as Mexico, Bahamas, Panama, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela—and increased in
some Southern Cone economies—Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (Gasparini 2003).
The weak macroeconomic performance over most of the continent during the 1980s
did not help improve the distribution income in most countries. London˜o and
Sze´kely (2000) report that the average income ratio of top to bottom quintiles in
Latin American countries fell from 22.9 in 1970 to 18.0 in 1982, but rose back to
22.9 by 1991.
Aggregate trends for the region can be computed since the early 1990s, when
most countries in the region consolidated their household survey programs.37
Gasparini et al. (2011) report that the mean Gini for the region increased over the
1990s and fell in the first half of the 2000s, with levels in or around 2006 similar to
those of the early 1990s. However, they also report that weighting the indices by
population changes the whole picture: Brazil and Mexico account jointly for 56% of
the region’s population, and experienced stronger equalizing changes than the rest
of the countries over the 2000s. The weighted mean of the Gini coefficient is
significantly lower in the mid 2000s than in the early 1990s, but although the
direction of the overall change in inequality is not ambiguous, the magnitudes are
relatively small. The unweighted mean of the Gini first increased and then fell less
37 The estimates correspond to selected continental Latin American countries. Information for Caribbean
countries is not presented as no country in that sub-region has reliably comparable information available
for the early 1990 s. See CEDLAS (2008) for documentation on the coverage of the Socio-Economic
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), the source of the figures in this section.
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than 2 points since the early 1990s, and similar patterns emerge when considering
inequality of income for the region as a whole (Gasparini et al. 2011).38
3.4.1 Heterogeneity at the country level
The overall regional pattern described above, however, masks important differences
at the country level. Figure 12 presents the values of the Gini coefficients in the
early 1990s and in the mid 2000s for Latin American countries.39 Figure 12
suggests a sort of continuum of inequality levels across countries, with values
ranging from the low forties up to about sixty Gini points. Uruguay, Venezuela,
Argentina and Costa Rica have relatively low inequality levels, while Bolivia, Haiti,
Brazil and Colombia are among the most unequal societies in the region.40
Latin American countries also differ in the changes of inequality experienced
over the period under analysis. Figure 13 presents the changes in inequality (Gini
coefficient) for the same countries for the whole early 1990s-mid 2000s period, and
for 5 year subperiods. In 7 cases out of 17, inequality did not increase over the
1990s. While the fall in inequality in the 2000s seems more widespread, there are
some exceptions. When taking the whole period into consideration, about the same
number of countries experienced increases and falls in the Gini coefficients.
3.4.2 Argentina and neighboring countries
Figures 14 and 15 depict the Gini coefficients for selected countries in Latin
America from 1992 to the mid 2006. As it was apparent in previous figures, the
increase in inequality in Argentina is among the largest for the whole period
(comparable to that in Costa Rica). The gap with more unequal economies, like
Brazil, Mexico or Chile, fell substantially in the last two decades. Income disparities
grew during the period of structural reforms of the 1990s, accelerated during the
deep macroeconomic crisis of 2001–2002, and fell to pre-crisis levels in the
recovery between 2003 and 2006. Neighboring Uruguay, also a country with
relatively low levels of inequality, also experienced an increase since the early
1990s, although with a smoother pattern. The Gini coefficient increased by 2 points
in the 1990s, grew by around 2 additional points in the stagnation and crisis of the
early 2000s, and fell 2 points in the subsequent recovery.
Venezuela has the most egalitarian income distribution in the Andean region.
Inequality rose substantially in the 1990s, with a Gini of 42.5 in 1989, increasing to
38 Regarding sub-regional trends, the changes in inequality were similar in the Andean countries and in
the rest of South America: the Gini increased in the 1990s and fell in the 2000s. In contrast, on average
the Gini has been slowly falling in Mexico and Central American countries since the early 1990s
(Gasparini et al. 2011).
39 Most of the results discussed in this section are robust to inequality indices, income definitions,
treatment of zero incomes, and sample variability concerns. The reader is referred to the SEDLAC
webpage (www.cedlas.org) for a large set of statistics on these issues.
40 Even within sub-regions the gaps in inequality levels are large: Southern South America encompasses
some of the countries with the lowest (Uruguay) and highest (Brazil) Ginis in LAC; the same is true for
the Andean region (Venezuela and Colombia), Central America (El Salvador and Honduras), and the
Caribbean (Dominican Republic and Haiti).
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47.2 in 1998, and fluctuating around that level until 2005. Costa Rica also presents
low levels of inequality in a regional perspective, and inequality also increased
substantially in the second half of the 1990s. While it has fallen in the 2000s, it has
not returned to its previous level: the Gini coefficient for the distribution of
household per capita income climbed rose from 44.6 in 1995 to 50.0 in 2001, and
fell only to 47.3 in 2005.
These experiences contrast with those of other countries in the region with high
levels of inequality. Brazil has always been one of the most unequal economies in
the region. While its income distribution did not change much in the first half of the
1990s, inequality has fallen substantially since 1999; the Gini coefficient was 60.4
in 1990, 58.6 in 1999, and fell to 55.9 in 2006. High levels of inequality have also
been a pervasive characteristic of the Chilean economy. However, there are
encouraging signs of a significant fall in inequality in the 2000s. The Gini
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Fig. 12 Inequality in Latin America, 1992 and 2006. Gini coefficients Source: own calculations based on
SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank)
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coefficient, roughly unchanged between 1990 and 2000 (55.1 and 55.2, respec-
tively), fell slightly by 2003 (54.6) and by a larger degree by 2006, reaching 51.8.
Finally, the data for Mexico indicate a slow, although continuous, reduction in
income inequality since the early 1990s. The largest fall occurred between 2000 and
2002. The Gini in 2006, at around 50, was almost 5 points lower than in 1992.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper described the level and evolution of inequality in Argentina over three
quarters of the twentieth century. The evidence for the older period originates in tax
returns data, while the figures from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s are based on
household surveys. The review of the trends of inequality and the empirical
evidence on its determinants attempted to establish which factors made the
Argentine case exceptional—both with respect to other countries in Latin America
and to other nations relatively better off at the beginning of the 20th century.
Argentina’s level of income started to diverge from that of other rich countries
before the middle of the 20th century. The country was also substantially more
unequal than others in this selected group, although also relatively more equal than
its regional neighbors. The evidence discussed in the previous pages is illustrative of
the comparative trends: the gap with traditionally more unequal economies, like
Brazil or Chile, substantially shrunk in the last decades of the 20th century.
Argentina’s income distribution, characterized by a large middle class and large
groups with middle and higher educational attainment, was once proudly described
as ‘‘European’’ (or more ‘‘European’’ than that of its regional partners, in any case).
The average increase in inequality in Argentina has outpaced regional averages with
periods of negative growth hitting the poor strongly, while its larger neighbors
experienced significant declines: the country seemed to move closer to ‘‘Latin
American’’ levels since the early 1990s. Notwithstanding this trend, Argentina’s
human development index has remained among the highest in Latin America since
its publication in 1975, and the post 2002 crisis recovery was accompanied by
substantial reductions in inequality—notwithstanding it is too early to judge if this is
the beginning of a sustainable downward trend o only a correction of a crisis
induced ‘‘overshooting’’.
While not the sole case in the region, both the original low levels of inequality
and its upward trend since the mid 1970s are characteristic of the Argentine case. Is
there any exceptionality in these developments? The economic determinants of
inequality trends discussed in this paper were present in most (if not all) Latin
American economies: macroeconomic crises, structural reforms, trade liberaliza-
tion. However, the strength or scope of these factors seems to be the first exceptional
characteristic of the Argentine case. Macroeconomic crises (such as the 2001–2002
collapse and the hyperinflation episodes) were particularly virulent, and the long-
term macroeconomic performance (the stagnation in per capita income) is
exceptionally disappointing. Moreover, while most countries in the region adopted
different aspects of market-oriented reforms, Argentina reformed most aspects of
economic life simultaneously, and more deeply and more quickly than its neighbors,
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especially in the 1990s—the only comparable (and earlier) case is that of Chile
under a military regime.41 The crises and the reforms over the last few decades in
Argentina have been deeper and more sudden than in other countries in the region.
Besides the extreme nature of most changes in Argentina, the special
characteristics of its social structure also played a role in its large increase in
inequality. In the mid 1970s, the Argentine society was characterized by a relatively
equal income distribution, and specifically by the presence of a large fraction of
workers with middle and high qualifications. The Gini coefficient in those years was
not very far from continental Europe countries in 2000. Moreover, according to
some authors, the emergence of this publicly educated workforce can be linked to
the demand for services by the elite in a land rich economy [see Galiani et al.
(2008)]. This modern economy was thus probably more prepared than that of its
regional neighbors to incorporate more capital and new technologies, and to absorb
the changes brought by market-oriented reforms and liberalization. As discussed at
length previously, most of these changes are inequality-increasing, in the short and
medium run at least. This apparent convergence with its neighbors might be related
to the comparatively higher levels of education in Argentina’s population, which
resulted in lower initial levels of inequality.
There are, however, other simultaneous factors that have only been partially
accounted for in this discussion. Explaining the breadth and speed of crises and
reforms, and of the political factors behind them, such as the specificity of the
federal structure of the country or of the Peronist coalition, is beyond the scope of
this paper. Other papers in this special collection shed some light on the
exceptionality of these factors in the Argentine case.
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